Addis-Ababa Agreement between two Sudans is bony fish worth chewing
By
John A. Akec
Personal
circumstances did not allow me to comment on the September 27th 2012
agreement between South Sudan and Sudan in the Ethiopian Capital, Addis-Ababa. That now the agreement is facing some tremendous
challenges to implementation, especially with new "conditionalitie"s
and interpretation being introduced by the government of Sudan; it is opportune
time to revisit the agreement in order to re-examine its utility.
It
is not the first time that South Sudan reaches an agreement with North Sudan in
Ethiopia. In March 1972, a peace deal that was brokered by Emperor Haile Sellassie,
in partnership with the Organisation of African Unity (AOU), and the World
Council of Churches brought to an end a 17-year war that was waged by South
Sudan Liberation Movement (popularly known as Anya Nya) against the central
government in Khartoum. The Addis-Ababa
agreement of 1972 gave the South an autonomous government and brought relative peace
to the region that lasted for 10 years until 1983 when the hostilities resumed.
However,
this last agreement is of a different sort. If implemented successfully, it
would be a door to creating mutually beneficial relationships in the short and
medium term, and even long term between two entities with long history of
conflict, mistrust, broken-promises, and mutual prejudice behind them. Like any
broken marriage, sorting and dividing the properties of the old house can be messy,
painful, time-consuming, and stressful. It demands patience and wisdom from
leaders and governments of the two countries concerned.
Therefore,
to imply that the nine protocols of Addis-Ababa Agreement could be executed at
single whoop is too optimistic an assumption and far removed from hard
realities of life. The painful, and eventually, the partial implementation of
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement is a testimony to this fact. Like any
agreement, some protocols are critical and others important in determining the success
or failure of an agreement.
Thus,
the partners to the agreement can do well in first pursuing the implementation of the most straight forward protocols
while continue to work out the modalities for the implementation of the more thorny
and protocols that are subject to different interpretations by the signing
parties like Abyei, border demarcation, formation of demilitarized zone, and mutual
accusations of harbouring or supporting the opposition and political dissidents from the other country.
This
is because, like it or not, neither government of South Sudan nor that of Sudan
can control what happens in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Darfur. Only political and negotiated settlement within countries concerned can
restore true peace in those areas as opposed to purely military solutions as
the government of Sudan would have the world believe.
Furthermore more, the idea of a peaceful demilitarized zone between the South and North Sudan in area where armed dissidents hold sway is not a few-day affair to clean it up, but would take years of protracted political and socio-economic efforts to combat. And in those situations, it is always illusive to bring hard evidence as to who is supporting who in such lawless zones.
Furthermore more, the idea of a peaceful demilitarized zone between the South and North Sudan in area where armed dissidents hold sway is not a few-day affair to clean it up, but would take years of protracted political and socio-economic efforts to combat. And in those situations, it is always illusive to bring hard evidence as to who is supporting who in such lawless zones.
It
is therefore a serious strategic and diplomatic error for the government of
Sudan to continue to block the resumption of export of South Sudan's oil through
its territory as well as hindering border trade and economic cooperation
between the two countries on the grounds of the alleged support of South Sudan
to SPLM-North.
While
the Juba government had earlier committed similar error of judgement when it decided
to suddenly shut down oil production in January 2012, the revenue of which
formed 98 percent of its income, it has since corrected its earlier unattractive
offer by making substantial concession to Sudan that would amount to payment of
an estimated (combined) USD 25 per barrel of crude in transit fees and direct money to be transferred to government of Sudan in the next three years. This was many orders
of magnitude higher than the initial offering of 69 cents per barrel.
What's
more, the resumption of oil production
would allow the two countries to revive their battered economies (mostly the
result of loss of oil revenue from their budgets) and ease economic pressures
the two governments are currently facing at home-front. Border trade, and 4
freedoms also lend themselves to easy implementation, with potentially positive
impacts on the relations between the two countries to follow suite.
It
will also gives clear thinking to the leaderships of the two countries
while they strive to use diplomatic means to sort out the problems of Abyei,
border demarcation, and demilitarized zone; and address issues related to dissidents
from each other's country using the most appropriate tools that will justly address
the underlying causes, and not mere symptoms.
It
is also worth mention that it is not very accurate continuing to draw moral equivalence
between what is happening in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur with the activities of tribal militants in South Sudan. They do not weigh on the same scale.
This is because problems in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile are as
serious as those which were posed by South North war. The same could not be
said about militia activities in South Sudan.
What
is crucial to bringing lasting peace in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur is
a radical shift in government of Sudan's view point, which at the moment, looks
at these matters through a security prism. Instead, they require revitalization
of Doha Agreement with Darfur groups and re-adoption of Nafi/Agar framework
agreement of 28th July 2011 which was turned down by the
National Congress Party leadership. And all this is going to take time to bear fruits.
Failing
that, we do not need to dig too far into the past history that dissidents with a
cause will continue to disturb peace in their mother countries no matter what
the neighbouring countries try to do, and no amount of diplomatic or military efforts can contain them. For example, the expulsion of Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) from
Ethiopia in 1991 did not end its struggle. Palestinians were expelled from
Jordan and Lebanon many times in 1970s and 80s and it did not end their
struggle. The closing of Chadian borders in the face of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) did not
bring stability to North and Eastern Darfu. With one of the best armies in the world neither the Republic of Ireland nor government of Great Britain could stop IRA dissidents to smuggle weapons into mainland Britain, and so on and so forth.
Stopping
of oil export, therefore, will do nothing to restore stability in these areas
of Sudan. But quite the contrary, it would now give license to South Sudan to
collaborate with these elements to liberate Abyei and other border areas occupied by Sudan.
And
quite understandably, the Sudanese authorities are adamant about the disarming
of its political dissidents in its conflict areas (which it claims are supported
by South Sudan) as a prerequisite to resumption of oil export through its
territory, fearing the fate of Soviet Union or former Yugoslavia could befall
their country. This again, stopping or allowing the flow of oil will have zero
effect in changing the course of events. Only the Sudanese themselves on both sides of the conflict hold the key as to
whether such further break up of their country could be arrested; made as bloodless and painless as happened in Soviet
Union; or allowed to becomes as bloody and painful as happened in former Yugoslavia.
If
this later scenario comes to predominate the scene, South Sudan will in the meantime
be challenged to stay homogeneous and harmonious in the face of rising
economic difficulties and deteriorating security situation in and around its
national capital, Juba.
Otherwise, Addis-Ababa Agreement is a bony fish
that is worth chewing, while the thorny issues continue to be sorted and
filtered out in the most diplomatic and amicable manner. This will lay a solid
foundation for sisterly coexistence between two Sudans. This is the best and most desirable scenario. However, the way I see it, the ball is more or less in Sudan's government court.
2 Comments:
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By Unknown, At 4:15 AM
If used effectively, it would be a entry to developing mutually useful relationships in the short and method term, and even long durable between two companies with long record of issue, question, broken-promises, and common propensity behind them.
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